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Civic Republican Medical Ethics 
 
Abstract: This article develops a civic republican approach to medical ethics. It 
outlines civic republican concerns about the domination that arises from 
subjection to an arbitrary power of interference, while suggesting republican 
remedies to such domination in healthcare. These include proposals for greater 
review, challenge, and pre-authorisation of medical power. It extends this 
analysis by providing a civic republican account of assistive arbitrary power, 
showing how it can create similar problems within both formal and informal 
relationships of care, and offering strategies for tackling it. Two important 
objections to civic republican medical ethics — that it overvalues independence 
and political participation in healthcare — are also considered and rebutted. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The civic republican tradition in political philosophy can provide us with valuable 
tools for analysing social power in medical contexts. Yet, despite some limited 
discussion in philosophy of disability and public health ethics,[1-5] republicanism 
remains marginal at best within medical ethics. This article shows how civic 
republicanism can help us to identify, problematise, and challenge often-neglected 
forms of arbitrary power in medicine. Furthermore, it demonstrates how a civic 
republican approach to medical ethics can be defended from the objections that it 
places too much value on the independence of individuals and imposes excessively 
demanding requirements for political participation. 
 
 
CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND DOMINATION 
 
The republican tradition comprises a loose collection of thinkers in the history of 
political thought who have drawn heavily on ancient Greek and particularly Roman 
writing about republics.[6-8] Among its major themes are the public good of the 
citizenry, the vehement rejection of tyranny and servility, the importance of civic 
virtues to maintaining political community, as well as a distinctive conception of 
liberty often contrasted with liberal accounts. The remarkable revival of civic 
republicanism within political theory in the past two decades has focused on this latter 
account of liberty, which is most often defined in opposition to domination.[9] 
 
While republican accounts of domination differ in their details, the following 
definition by Frank Lovett is particularly helpful: 
 
persons or groups are subject to domination to the extent that they are dependent on a social 
relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them.[10] 
 
Civic republican focus upon dependency underpins a concern with relationships 
which heighten vulnerability to the power of others – such as slavery, autocracy, 
colonialism, patriarchal marriage, and wage labour. The intensity of such dependency 
has been taken to be proportional to the unfeasibility, cost, and risk of exiting the 
relationship.[11] 
 
Domination is distinguished from mere dependency by an additional subjection to 
arbitrary power. The precise nature of the relevant arbitrariness remains contested, yet 
there is a broad republican opposition to power which can be exercised over someone 
through another’s uncontrolled or unaccountable will.[12] The relevant power is often 
– although not invariably – understood as “the capacity to interfere, on an arbitrary 
basis, in certain choices that the other is in a position to make.”[13] This encompasses 
abilities for intentional manipulation and coercion of the body or will, including 
powers to physically restrain or compel, to punish or credibly threaten punishment, or 
to deceptively shape beliefs or desires.[14] Our initial discussion will begin with this 
interference-centric domination in mind. 
 
Liberal thinkers often contrast liberty to interference with action rather than to 
domination.[15] Yet, republicans claim that liberty can be infringed by an arbitrary 
power to interfere, even when no actual interference takes place. Consider what 
Cicero says about slavery in this respect: “the most miserable feature of this condition 
is that, even if the master happens not to be oppressive, he can be so should he 
wish.”[16] The slave who happens to avoid interference is already sufficiently 
subordinate to the master to preclude her freedom, since she has no latitude to act for 
herself without his implicit permission, which may be withdrawn with impunity. Her 
master’s indulgence conditions everything she can do. While such a lack of security 
when subject to arbitrary power is itself enough to constitute unfreedom, her 
awareness of her vulnerability not only breeds harms such as fearful uncertainty, but 
can also further undermine liberty by incentivising servility towards the powerful. 
 
 
DOMINATION IN HEALTHCARE 
 
What is the upshot of this account of domination for medical ethics? Some civic 
republicans emphasise minimal procedural requirements for non-domination, 
whereby power is no longer arbitrary when it is reliably constrained by rules or 
processes that are common knowledge. The goal of such measures is to provide 
people with “reliable expectations”, so they “know exactly where they stand” with 
respect to power held over them.[17] For example, the so-called ‘doctrine of medical 
necessity’ can confound such expectations when used to justify wide-ranging and ill-
defined emergency powers to authorise compulsory treatment. Conversely, mental 
capacity legislation with transparent, well-demarcated, and enforceable criteria for 
compulsory treatment would reduce procedural arbitrariness even if such treatment 
were no less frequent as a result. Similarly, this kind of arbitrariness would be 
reduced by an explicit hospital visitors policy, which outlined who can visit and under 
what conditions, rather than ward managers deciding to disallow visitors on an ad hoc 
basis. Both measures would disrupt uncontrolled power within social relationships of 
dependence. When patients are confident that there are clear rules governing how 
power is exercised over them, this can also reduce the inclination to be deferential 
towards healthcare authorities in the hope of influencing their decisions. 
 
Restrictions on discretionary powers to interfere that are imposed by commonly 
known and enforceable rules can help prevent some people being at the mercy of 
another’s will. However, we might think that the codification of a practice does not 
necessarily preclude it being dominating, especially when the process of determining 
the rules themselves is uncontrolled, such that subjection to an arbitrary will takes 
place at a second-order level. What also matters is how and by whom social power is 
subject to control. For instance, one prominent republican account takes domination 
to be generated by power that is “not subject to your own control and in this sense is 
arbitrary.”[18] This control need not be absolute: what is required is that citizens are 
subject to power on an equal basis without some being fundamentally subordinate to 
others. In this respect, consider the conclusions of a report into services for 
individuals with intellectual disabilities who exhibit challenging behaviour: 
 Support staff had control over every aspect of the lives of participants, and the casual denial 
of participants’ requests is demonstrative of how little power and control participants 
sometimes had.[19]  
This is a striking example of dependence upon a relationship subjecting people to a 
power to interfere with their choices, without them possessing meaningful control 
over the conditions of its exercise, or a feasible means to exit the relationship. 
Domination will not always be so comprehensive, but this gives some sense of the 
profound differentials in authority and social status which civic republicans aim to 
problematise. 
 
The control over power necessary to avoid domination can be secured to a limited 
degree by citizens having equal access to the democratic process that generates laws 
authorising interference – for instance, ensuring the voices of patients are not 
drowned out by those of medical professionals or the healthcare industry lobby, and 
dismantling the barriers to voting that still exist for some people diagnosed with 
mental disorders or intellectual disabilities.[20] The greater contribution to reducing 
domination in healthcare, however, will be made by more direct and local 
mechanisms for restraining and shaping power.  
 
Some civic republicans have called for contestatory democracy, including 
“institutionalized forums for contestation”, where citizens can challenge 
domination.[21] Contestatory democracy requires that citizens are able to flag what 
they take to be arbitrary power over themselves, and to find impartial review, redress, 
and revision of policy. This suggests several measures within medicine: expansion of 
the purview of existing oversight instruments, such as mental health tribunals, to 
review the ability to interfere and not merely its exercise; fora within healthcare 
institutions that allow patients to periodically and publically hold to account those 
with powers of interference over them; and educational and political initiatives to 
inform patients of their legal and moral rights, and to foster their confidence to assert 
them.[22] 
 
Other republican strategies for combatting domination involve pre-authorisation 
rather than contestation. Pre-authorisation renders power over someone non-arbitrary 
insofar as they have controlled it in advance.[23] This provides civic republican 
grounds for recommending some familiar measures, such as advanced decision-
making in the context of declining or fluctuating mental capacity. It should also lead 
republicans to support forms of advanced care planning that are currently less 
common, including ‘crisis cards’ for patients who may experience psychotic episodes, 
and which outline an agreement with their care team about when they will and will 
not encounter interference with their actions.[24] For the civic republican, the primary 
goal of these measures is not to decrease interference, but to ensure that the power to 
interfere cannot be exercised in an arbitrary fashion, whereby some citizens are 
ancillary to others and subject to their mutable will. 
 
 
ASSISTIVE ARBITRARY POWER IN HEALTHCARE 
 
The domination considered so far arises from the arbitrary power to interfere with 
another’s choices within relations of social dependence. We should be careful not to 
underestimate the scope of such interference. While the paradigm cases are coercion 
and manipulation, some acts of medical omission will, in context, also count as 
interference on republican approaches – e.g. “the pharmacist who without good 
reason refuses to sell an urgently required medicine”.[25] Likewise, the intentional 
exploitation of medical need by making assistance extortionately expensive also 
constitutes interference – for instance, massively jacking up the price of a medicine to 
take advantage of a monopoly upon supply. Thus, domination can sometimes be 
generated by the arbitrary power to withhold or increase the costs of support. 
 
Some limitations in access to healthcare and assistance in adapting to illness or 
disability do not interfere per se but simply fail to provide an additional benefit.. 
Consider the power of healthcare staff to determine access to beneficial services in the 
absence of emergencies or intentional exploitation – for instance, deciding whether 
someone is prioritised for physical rehabilitation or offered additional sessions of 
psychotherapy. Likewise, coping with poor health is also affected by the willingness 
of friends and family to contribute, such as the extent to which they make themselves 
emotionally available, or are prepared to dedicate their time and resources to tasks 
like driving for someone with mobility problems. The non-conferral of these benefits 
does not ordinarily seem like outright interference, and thus even the capacity to 
arbitrarily withhold them will not amount to domination, so long as we retain an 
interference-centric account.  
 
Civic republicans do not always accept that domination presupposes the power to 
interfere. For example, Lovett denies that the power to raise costs and lower benefits 
of choices is more significant to domination than the power to raise their benefits and 
lower their costs. He reminds us that tremendous social power can be contained in 
offers and not simply threats (e.g. the power of an enormous retailer in its transactions 
with suppliers).[26] We do not need to determine here whether outright domination 
can be generated by arbitrary power to assist others within a relationship of 
dependence. It is sufficient to note that it can foster similar problems to the arbitrary 
power to interfere (as republican accounts of corruption and largesse have 
emphasised).[27] 
 
We might demur at the idea that power to make someone better off can make them 
less free. But this becomes more plausible when it is latitude over whether to meet 
someone’s basic needs within a relationship with high exit costs and few alternatives. 
Illness will often create these conditions by reducing a person’s own capacity to fulfil 
their needs, bear the costs of ending a relationship, and find new forms of support. 
The sheer vulnerability to being abandoned or neglected when already experiencing 
heightened needs may incentivise compliance and make opposing the will of others 
especially risky. Thus, dependence upon social relationships in which arbitrary power 
is assistive rather than interfering can exhibit comparable challenges to freedom as 
interference-centric domination. 
 
The provision of formal healthcare is seldom dependent on the radically uncontrolled 
will of medical staff. In the absence of immediate financial pressures, the main factors 
determining the care someone receives are institutional procedures and professional 
judgement. However, we should be sensitive to the harms that discretionary power to 
assist others can introduce when such procedures are lax and such judgement cannot 
be sufficiently held to account. The standard republican remedies would recommend 
ensuring that decisions about access to healthcare are guided by a consistent rationale 
which is transparently communicated. Furthermore, mechanisms must be in place to 
allow such decisions to be challenged, and to periodically review whether the current 
level of flexibility that healthcare gatekeepers are granted is becoming too stifling.  
 
The problem of assistive arbitrary power in relation to friends and family is even 
thornier. While these are relationships that can be strengthened by someone’s need for 
additional care, there is also potential for worrying imbalances of power when they 
are reliant on support that others are under no enforceable obligation to provide. Yet, 
it seems neither practicable nor desirable to demand that friends and family account 
for the level of support they are willing to provide, or to restrict their prerogative to 
provide no such assistance at all. Nonetheless, the problems of arbitrary assistive 
power can be indirectly lessened if someone can be confident that other forms of 
psychological and material support are available to them should their relationships 
with friends or family break down. When someone’s medical and wider needs can be 
met on a more secure basis, republicans can recognise that this leaves them less 
beholden to others, even if they never actually use such a failsafe. 
 
 
OVERVALUING INDEPENDENCE? 
 
Civic republicanism provides a framework for understanding how social relationships 
of dependence characterised by arbitrary power can contribute to subordinating some 
agents to others in problematic ways. But might such republican hostility to 
dependence be misguided? We are finite, vulnerable, social animals, who cannot 
feasibly dispense with relationships in which we depend or are depended upon by 
others. Fantasies of self-sufficiency which result in the disavowal or refusal of bonds 
of care can be deeply harmful. In this spirit, Alasdair Macintyre identifies “virtues of 
acknowledged dependence”, which facilitate social relationships in which we 
recognise human fragility, and are open to both giving and receiving help without 
undue reluctance.[28] Aaron Cobb has recently emphasised the significance of these 
virtues within medical ethics in enabling us “to appreciate human vulnerability and to 
respond with appropriate forms of care.”[29] 
 
Civic republicanism might seem to hinder this embrace of dependence. Marilyn 
Freidman explicitly accuses republicans of an “inadequate grasp of the essential role 
of dependency relationships in human life”,[30] which results in a failure to 
appreciate how much damage would be done to the ability to care for others by the 
attempt to minimise such dependency. For example, since the “capacity to help 
someone climb the stairs is also the capacity to throw her down the stairs”,[30] then 
eliminating relationships in which arbitrary power is held can also reduce 
opportunities for caring for someone. This challenge is particularly important for a 
civic republican approach to medical ethics because our need for social support can be 
so much greater when we are ill. 
 If a civic republican medical ethics required wholesale opposition to caring 
relationships in which those with poor health are reliant on others, then its aversion to 
dependence would be excessive. This is not the case on the analysis developed here, 
which only problematises social relationships of dependence which embed arbitrary 
power over others – whether that is the arbitrary power to interfere, or the more 
expansive withholding of support for the provision of basic needs. Dependence is not 
a locus of republican opposition in the absence of such power, and there is no intrinsic 
problem with medical or caring relationships which have high psychological or 
material barriers to exit. 
 
There remain problematic situations where the combination of social dependence and 
arbitrary power are difficult or impossible to disentangle from the capacity to provide 
valuable care for others. Yet, when it is not practicable to eliminate domination or 
other combinations of dependence and arbitrary power in healthcare provision, the 
civic republican does not transform into the zealot that Friedman fears – refusing to 
countenance any insufficiently controlled power. They instead recommend that the 
evaluation of rival healthcare policies recognises it is a major advantage to avoid 
some citizens being significantly subordinate to others due to such arbitrary power 
held over them. To structure social relationships so that some are not unnecessarily at 
the mercy of others is an important goal in healthcare provision; yet, republicans need 
not be committed to paying any price in human health to secure it. 
 
 
OVERVALUING PARTICIPATION? 
 
We can take seriously civic republican concerns about a subset of dependent 
relationships in the context of medicine without unreasonably marginalising valuable 
relationships of care in which the sick are reliant upon the support of others. But 
republican approaches to medical ethics might appear to be vulnerable to another 
objection: that they are too burdensome not for the recipients of care but for the 
citizenry as a whole. This criticism takes aim at the participatory civic culture that 
republicans promote in order to achieve goods like non-domination. 
 
Discussing republican public health ethics, Stephen Latham tell us that, “Non-
domination, as Oscar Wilde might have said, will take a lot of evenings.”[31] He 
believes that the provision of health is best left to competent governments who we are 
able to replace if necessary. Latham recognises that republicans may propose a 
division of labour whereby not all citizens must devote their time to combatting 
domination in health contexts. Furthermore, he notes that the sheer willingness of 
citizens to hold those with power to account can often be an effective constraint – 
exercising a ‘virtual influence’ on healthcare policy. Nevertheless, Latham asks:  
 
Might it not be better for a government simply (and paternalistically) to give the people the 
health—and the security, and the peace—they need, without demanding their legitimizing 
engagement in that project, in a way that leaves them free to engage their attentions and 
cultivate their virtues in pursuit of higher, weaker values?[32] 
 
Similarly, do we have nothing better to do with our evenings than the laborious 
organisational work a vigilant citizenry would need to undertake to effectively 
challenge the dependent relationships embedding arbitrary power identified by a civic 
republican medical ethics? 
 
It is worth noting that the civic republican goal of reducing social dependence 
underpinned by arbitrary power in healthcare will not stand or fall with popular 
participation. Some measures require little to no civic engagement – for example, the 
state might unilaterally increase the choice of medical services available to patients, 
or the financial, social care, or rehousing support it provides to sick or disabled 
individuals, in order to lessen their vulnerability to the uncontrolled will of particular 
healthcare providers or informal carers. Other proposals would require participation 
only from some of those running or directly affected by medical institutions, such as 
efforts to identify and remedy domination by providing long-term patients with fora 
within which they can scrutinise the power to which they are subject. Thus, even 
those sharing Latham’s scepticism about the net benefits of an engaged citizenry 
willing to challenge domination in healthcare can still endorse other aspects of civic 
republican approaches to medical power. 
 
The more fundamental challenge to republicanism posed by Latham is the suggestion 
that healthcare should be delivered by technocratic governments without much gained 
by the extra-electoral participation of citizens. Of course, this rests on a no less 
controversial understanding of political life and its relation to health. The wager made 
by radical republicans is that given the alternative between acting for others and 
enabling them to act for themselves, there is something of value in their democratic 
self-rule.[33] While this is not a political and ethical ideal that can be 
comprehensively defended here, it should be particularly attractive on the terrain of 
health. This is not only because greater participation of patients could further check 
the subset of problematic dependencies that civic republicanism identifies, but also 
because hierarchical distributions of power in some medical institutions unduly 
restrict the diversity of experience that informs decision-making within these 
organisations. Significantly, neither claim relies upon the more contentious 
perfectionist idea that participatory self-rule is the proper end of human beings. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has outlined the contribution civic republicanism can make to medical 
ethics. Republican conceptions of domination help to articulate the threats posed by 
even unexercised medical power to interfere when it can be used arbitrarily. This 
might find practical expression in an expanded purview for mechanisms of review 
such as tribunals, more institutional spaces in which patients can query the power held 
over them, and greater use of pre-authorisation strategies such as advanced care 
planning. Civic republicanism also shows how assistive arbitrary power can be 
problematic, which should prompt us to value transparency in healthcare gatekeeping 
decisions and alternative options for those in both formal and informal care 
relationships. The civic republican opposition to dependence in healthcare is 
appropriate when its focus is social relationships marked by arbitrary power to 
interfere or withhold assistance towards basic needs, rather than any contingent acts 
of mutual aid or care.  Furthermore, the republican emphasis on civic participation 
was found neither to be required by all its normative recommendations nor to be 
necessarily an excessive ideal within healthcare. Thus, this suggests that medical 
ethics is likely to be enriched by greater engagement with civic republican concepts, 
values, and policy proposals. 
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